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Rouse v. Lee
339 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2003)
L Faas
On March 16, 1991, several officers, responding to a call, arrived at a
convenience store called The Pantry.' The store was in disorder and the cash
register had been moved. There was blood near the cash register and on a bar
stool 3 Officer Mark Hinshaw ("Binshaw") and Sergeant York found Kenneth
Bernard Rouse ("Rouse") against a wall.' Rouse had blood on him, including on
his pants, hands, waist, legs, and underwear, and had abrasions on his knees.'
Rouse's bel hung off and his pants were unzipped.6 After finding three rolls of
pennies in Rouse's pockets, the officers took Rouse away.7
The officers found Hazel Colleen Broadway ("Broadway"), sixty-three years
of age, lying on the floor of the convenience store in a pool of blood She
attempted to say something to inshaw, but died before she was able.9 Broadway had blood and hand prints all over her body.'0 She wore a blouse and her
pants were pulled down to her ankles." When paramedics attempted to apply
cardioelectrodes to her body, they discovered a knife, bent at a ninety-degree
angle just below the handle, in Broadway's neck 2
The blood on Rouse's hands, shirt, and underwear matched the samples of
blood taken from Broadway. 3 The medical examiner determined that Broadway
died as a result of blood loss caused by the stab wound that severed the carotid
arteryand jugular vein. 4 Broadwaysustained numerous other wounds including
bruises, stab wounds, and abrasions.
1.

State v. Rouse, 451 S.E.2d 543, 548-49 (N.C 1994).

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id at 549.
Id
Id
Id
Id
Rowe4 451 S.E.2d at 549.

Id
Id

10.
11.
12.
13.

Id
Id
Id
Rome,451 S.E.2d at 549.

14.
15.

Id
Id
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In 1992, ajuryfound Rouse guiltyof first-degree and felonymurder. 16 He
was also found "guilty of robberywith a dangerous weapon and attempted firstdegree rape."'" At the sentencing hearing, the jury recommended the death
penalty and the court sentenced Rouse "to death for first-degree murder, forty
years imprisonment for armed robbery, and twenty years imprisonment for
attempted first-degree rape." 8 The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed
the convictions and the sentences. 9
After sentencing, Rouse discovered that one of the jurors failed to reveal
during voir dire that his mother was sexually assaulted and murdered by a man
who received the death penaltyfor that crime.20 Moreover, the juror "expressed
intense racial prejudice against African Americans." 2 He suggested that African
Americans cared less for life than Caucasians and declared that African American
men rape Caucasian women for the purpose of bragging to their friends.22
Allegedly, the juror intentionally suppressed his bias to obtain a seat on the jury
in order to judge Rouse, who is African American.23 Rouse had no opportunity
to object to the juror, nor to challenge his ability to judge and sentence Rouse
impartially, because the juror did not express these sentiments during voir dire. 4
Rouse collaterally attacked the judgment of the state court, noting the juror
bias, by filing a Motion for Appropriate Relief ("MAR") in state court.2" The
state court, without a hearing, denied Rouse post-conviction relief.26 However,
the Supreme Court of North Carolina granted certiorari and remanded the case
for reconsideration in light of recent North Carolina cases. 27 The state postconviction court, again without a hearing, denied Rouse relief "and the Supreme
Court of North Carolina denied his second petition for certiorari on February 5,
1999.

" 28

'16. Id at 548.
17. Id
18. Id
19. R=e, 451 S.E2d at 574.
20. Rouse v. Lee, 314 F.3d 698, 700 (4th CQr. 2003), 1a dby314 F.3d 698 (4th ir. 2003),
nb'en/ ,b 339 F.3d 238 (4th Car. 2003).
21. Rome, 314 F.3d at 700.
22. Rcse, 451 S.E2d at 574.
23.
Id
24. id
25. Route, 314 F.3d at 701; se N.C GEN. STAT. S 15A-1415 (2001) (explaining when a
defendant may assert a MAR and the appropriate grounds upon which the defendant may assert
a MAR).
26. Rome, 314 F.3d at 701.
27. Id; seeState v. Rouse, 510 S.E.2d 669,669 (N.C 1998) (granting certiorari and remanding
Rouse's MAR to the Superior Court of Randolph ounty).
28. Rcose, 314 F.3d at 701.
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Subsequently, Rouse filed a petition for habeas relief in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina on February 8, 2000.29
The petition alleged that the juror's bias denied Rouse his Sixth Amendment
right to a fair and impartial jury." The State moved to dismiss Rouse's petition
as untimely." The magistrate judge reviewed the motion and found that because
the deadline set by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
("AEDPA") fell on Saturday, February 5,2000, Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure "extended the deadline to the next working day, Monday,
February7, 2000.32 Thus, the magistrate judge concluded that the petition was
filed one daylate and rejected Rouse's equitable tolling arguments." The magis34
trate judge recommended that the district court grant the motion to dismiss.
The district court adopted the magistrate's recommendation and dismissed the
petition as untimely." The district court denied Rouse's subsequent motion to
alter the judgment. 6 Rouse appealed the decision that his petition was filed
untimelyto the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth CrcuitY Apanel
of the Fourth Circuit reversed the district courts dismissal. 8 However, "[ulpon
the state's suggestion, a majorityof the full-time, active circuit court judges voted
to rehear the case en bw " "
II. Hdkirg
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court's dismissal of Rouse's federal habeas petition as untimely.? The
Fourth Circuit held that Rouse was not entitled to statutory tolling beyond the
date when the Supreme Court of North Carolina denied his petition for certiorari." The Fourth Circuit also held that Rouse was not entitled to equitable
29.

Id
Id; sw US. COMT. amend VI (stating that "[in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State").
31. R=xe4 314 F.3d at 701.
32. Id; se28 U.S.C S 2244(d) (2000) (setting forth a statute of limitations for writ of habeas
30.

corpus; part of AEDPA); FED. 1 CV. P. 6(a) (describing how to compute "any period of time
prescribed or allowed by... [the] rules").
33. Rouse, 314 F.3d at 701.
34. Id
35. Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238, 243 (4th CAr. 2003).
36. Id
37. Id
38. Id
39. Id
40. Id at 241.
41. R=4 339 F.3d at 257.
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tolling because he failed to show "any extraordinary circumstances beyond his
control that prevented him from complying with the statute of limitations."42
IfI. AmnVs is
A. Stantowy TdU1
AEDPA was signed into law, and immediately became effective, on April
24, 1996." 3 AEDPA provides that "[a] 1-year period of limitation shall applyto
an application for a writ of habeas corpus bya person in custodypursuant to the
judgment of a State court."" AEDPA states that the one-year period begins to
run on the date on which the judgment became final.4 For prisoners whose
convictions became final before AEDPA was enacted, like Rouse, the one-year
limitations period began to run on the date AEDPA became effective, April 24,
1996. The Fourth Circuit stated that absent tolling, Rouse had until April 24,
1997 to file his federal habeas petition. 47 On February 8, 2000, Rouse filed his
petition for federal habeas relief.4"
The AEDPA statute of limitations period is tolled during the time in which
"'a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review
with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.' "9 The Fourth
Circuit agreed with the district court that Rouse's MAR "was no longer pending
once the Supreme Court of North Carolina denied certiorari on February 5,
1999. " " Therefore, the Fourth Circuit held that Rouse was not entitled to
statutory tolling past that date."'

42. Id at 241.
43. Id at 243; sw 28 U.S.C S 2244 (2000) (discussing the filing of a federal habeas petition;
part of AEDPA).
44. R0s 339 F.3d at 243 (quoting 28 US.C S 2244(d)(1)).
45. See28 U.S.C S2244(d)(1)(A) (stating that a judgment becomes final "bythe conclusion
of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review"; part of AEDPA).
46. Rcue 339 F.3d at 243.
47. Id It is interestg to note that the Fourth Circuit interpreted the one-year limitations
period as running from April 24, 1996, to April 24, 1997. The court should have recognized that
the one-year period expired on April 25, 1997. The Fourth Circuit's calculation denies petitioners
the full year provided for in AEDPA by providing only 364 days to fie a federal habeas petition.
48. Id
49. Id (quoting 28 U.S.C S 2244(d)(2)); see Taylor v. Lee, 186 F.3d 557, 561 (4th Gr. 1999)
(stating that "under S 2244(d)(2) the entire period of state post-conviction proceedings, from initial
iling to final disposition by the highest state court (whether decision on the merits, denial of
r appellate review), is tolled from the
certiorari, or expiration of the period of time to seek =
limitations period for federal habeas corpus petitioners").
50. Romse, 339 F.3d at 244, 246.
51.
Id at 246.
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1. Nord) Gwiim Rule q'AppeY~ae Pntxaim32(b)
Rouse argued "that his MAR remained pending for twenty days after the
state court denied certiorari" pursuant to North Carolina Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32(b). 2 Rule 32(b) states that unless "a court orders otherwise, its
clerk shall enter judgment and issue the mandate of the court 20 days after the
written opinion of the court has been filed with the clerk" 3 Rouse argued that
under this rule his MAR remained pending until February 25, 1999.'
The Fourth Curcuit found that Rule 32(b) did not applyto the state court's
denial of Rouse's petition for writ of certiorari. 5 The court reiterated that a
mandate does not issue after a denial of certiorari because there is no further
action for the lower court to take upon the petition's denial.' Similarly, because
a denial of certiorari signals the court's refusal to determine the rights and
obligations of parties, a judgment cannot be entered."' In addition, Rouse failed
to submit any evidence that a mandate ever issued in his case."8 The Fourth
Circuit concluded that Rule 32(b) did not cause Rouse's MARto remain pending
for twenty days beyond the state court's denial of certiorari."

2. Nonh CGdim Rule qfAppdlatePwai

31(g)

Rouse also argued that "his petition remained pending during the period in
which he could have sought rehearing from the Supreme Court of North
Carolina. " ' ° The Fourth Circuit found that North Carolina law did not support
Rouse's argument." General Statutes of North Carolina section 15A- 1411(b)
provides that "a MAR is part of the original action, and thus, criminal in
nature."62 According to North Carolina Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 1(g),
petitions for rehearing are not available in criminal proceedings3 Rouse argued
52.
Id at 244; seN.C. APP.P. 32(b) (discussing when the judgment and mandate of a court
shall issue).
53.
N.C F,. APP. P. 32(b).
54. Rce, 339 F.3d at 244.
55.
Id
56. Id
57. Id; seeFekon v. Barnett, 912 F.d 92,94 (4th Cr. 1990) (holding that a "denial of . . writ
[of certiorari from the Supreme Court of North Carolina] is not a judgment but is simplya refusal
to hear the appeal").
58. Rcoe, 339 F.3d at 244.
59. Id
60. Id
61. Id at 244-45.
62. Id at 245; sw N.C. GEN. STAT. S 15A- 1411(b) (2001) (explaining that a MAR is part of
the original proceeding and is therefore part of a criminal proceeding).
63. Rce, 339 F.3d at 245; see N.C. APP. P. 31(g) (stating that petitions for rehearing are
not available in criminal proceedings).
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that regardless of Rule 31(g), his MAR was still pending because, on occasion, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina has used its discretionary power to rehear
petitions.64 The Fourth Grcuit explained that this situation did not mean that the
state proceeding remained "pending.""3 Thus, the Fourth Circuit found that Rule
31(g) did "not extend the pendency of Rouse's state post-conviction review."'
3. FaeralRule of Cl Pmai 6(e)
Finally,Rouse argued that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(e) extended the
AEDPA limitations period by three days.' 7 The Fourth Circuit found this
argument flawed in two ways.' 8 The Fourth Circuit determined that the "mailbox
rule" did not extend the AEDPA limitations period.' 9 The court stated that
Rouse was not a partyto any federal proceeding during the running of the statute
of limitations.'0 Second, the AEDPA limitations period runs from the date the
judgment becomes final, not from the date a party is served or notified of the
judgment."' Therefore, the Fourth Ctrcuit concluded that the mailbox rule did
not apply to Rouse and did not extend the one-year limitations period.72
B. Erdtane Tdig
1. Wx Exma 2 yCitu na25 Tat
sr the Fourth Circuit held that the AEDPA statute of
In Harris u Hmtxi47
limitations is subject to equitable tolling.'4 Yet, the court held that circumstances
rarelywarrant equitable tolling and "[alnyinvocation of equityto relieve the strict
application of a statute of limitations must be guarded and infrequent."" The
Harriscourt proposed a three-part test to determine whether equitable tolling is
64.

Rcoe, 339 F.3d at 245.

65.

Id

66.

Id

67. Id; see FED. R. Cv. P. 6(e) (stating that "[w]henever a party has the right or is required
to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or
other paer upon the party and the notice or paper is served upon the party by mail, 3 days shall
be added to the prescribed period").
68. Rcsex 339 F.3d at 245.
69. Id at 246.
70. Id at 245; se FED. R Cv. P. 6(e) (stating that the rule applies only to parties).
71. Rcoue 339 F.3d at 245; seeFED.K CIV. P. 6(e) (stating that the three-dayextension begins
after the service of a notice).
72. Roue, 339 F.3d at 246.
209 F.3d 325 (4th Gr. 2000).
73.
74. Rcse, 339 F.3d at 246; se Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 329-30 (4th Cir. 2000)
(holding that the AEDPA statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling).
75. Rse, 339 F.3d at 246 (quoting Hairis,209 F.3d at 330).
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appropriate.7 6 Under this test, a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if
he can show. "(1) extraordinarycircumstances, (2) beyond his control or external
to his own conduct, (3) that prevented him from filing on time."'
Rouse argued that his health during the limitations period prevented him
from filing his federal habeas petition on time.78 The district court declined to
apply equitable tolling because Rouse's medical condition did not render him
incompetent for any significant part of the limitations period.79 Rouse also
argued that his former habeas counsel's misinterpretation of the statutory
requirement constituted extraordinary circumstances beyond Rouse's control.8
The district court rejected Rouse's argument and held that a mistake of counsel
is not a ground for equitable tolling.
2. Staniad cReew
The Fourth Circuit discussed the proper standard for reviewing the district
court's denial of equitable tolling in Rouse's habeas claim." Until this case, the
Fourth Crcuit had not addressed whether an abuse of discretion or de novo
review should be used. 3 The court decided that "where the relevant facts are
undisputed and the district court denied equitable tolling as a matter of law, we
review the district court's decision de novo. .. in all other circumstances, we
review the denial of equitable tolling for an abuse of discretion." 4
tarxu Beyrm Rose's CatotdPmwnjHimFrrn
Fil4 on Tvm
Rouse first argued that equitable tolling was warranted because of his
medical condition during the limitations period. The Fourth Circuit agreed with
the district court that Rouse's medical condition was not an extraordinary
circumstance beyond his control that prevented him from filing on time.86
3. W4xdzrExtaordiny Cin

76. Id; se Harris, 209 F.3d at 330 (discussing the extraordinary circumstances test for
equitable tolling).
77. Rcoe 339 F.3d at 246.

78. Id at 248.
79. Id at 247.
80. Id at 248.
81. Id at 246-47.
82. Id at 247.
83. Rcmwe, 339 F.3d at 247.
84. Id at 248; se, eg, Chao v. Va. Dep't of Transp., 291 F.3d 276, 279-80 (4th CAr.2002)
(reviewing the district court's ruling on equitable tolling for abuse of discretion).
85. Romse, 339 F.3d at 248.
86.

Id at 247-48.
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Therefore, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when
it denied equitable tolling based on Rouse's health. 7
Rouse also argued that equitable tolling was warranted because his former
habeas counsel erred in interpreting the statutory filing deadline.8 8 The district
court held, as a matter of law, that attorney errors provide no basis for equitable
tolling. 9 The errors made byRouse's former counsel were neither extraordinary
nor external to Rouse's conduct.' On this basis, the Fourth Curcuit applied de
novo review to the district court's denial of equitable tolling."
In Harms, the Fourth Crcuit held that counsel's mistake in interpreting a
statute of limitations was not an extraordinary circumstance that warranted
equitable tolling." The majority of other circuits agree that attorney error
generally does not excuse a petitioner's failure to file a timely habeas petition."
The Fourth Crcuit also noted that "attorney error during habeas proceedings is
not itself a grund for relief in a [28 US.C] S2254 proceeding."" Furthermore,
the court found that the actions of Rouse's attorneys were attributable to Rouse
under standard principles of agency.9 Rouse bore the risk of his counsel's error
because he knowinglyand voluntarily chose to be represented bythem. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit found that the actions of Rouse's attorneys were attributable to Rouse and did not present circumstances external to Rouse's own con-

87.
88.
89.

Id at 248.
Id
Id

90. Id
91. Rose, 339 F.3d at 248.
92. Id; see Hartis, 209 F.3d at 331 (stating that "a mistake by a party's counsel in interpreting
a statute of limitations does not present the extraordinarycircumstance beyond the party's control
where equity should step in to give the party the benefit of his erroneous understanding").
93. Rse 339 F.3d at 248 (citing Merritt v. Blaine, 326 F.3d 157,169 (3d Cir. 2003) (following "the general rule that 'attorneyerror, miscalculation, inadequate research, or other mistakes have
not been found to rise to the 'extraordinary' circumstances required for equitable tolling' ")); seealso
Fierro v. Cockrell, 294 F.3d 674,683 (5th CAr. 2002) (stating that "counsel's erroneous interpretation

of the statute of limitations provision cannot, byitself, excuse the failure to file [the] habeas petition
in the district court within the one-year limitations period").
94. Rome, 339 F.3d at 249; se 28 U.S.C S 2254() (2000) (stating that "[t]he effectiveness or
incompetence of counsel during Federal or State collateral post-conviction proceedings shall not
be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under section 2254"; part of AEDPA).
95. Rose, 339 F.3d at 249; se Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753-54 (1991) (stating
that attorney error, except such error that rises to the level of ineffective assistance, is attributable
to the client under standard agency principles).

96. Rose, 339 F.3d at 249 n.12; smMurrayv. Carrier, 477 US. 478, 488 (1986) (explaining
that attorney error does not constitute cause for procedural default).
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duct."' The court held that Rouse failed to satisfy the extraordinary circumstances test and was not entitled to equitable tolling.98
4. Daeb Dos NatMatter
Rouse argued that the significance of the juror misconduct claim and the
fact that he faced a death sentence should be factored into the equitable tolling
analysis." The exceptional circumstances test required a petitioner to show
extraordinary circumstances beyond his control that prevented him from filing
his federal habeas petition on time."° "[Nleither the nature of Rouse's claims
nor his sentence was a factor 'beyond his control'" that affected his ability to
meet the statutory deadline. 0 1 Rouse argued that because death is different, an
entirely different test for equitable tolling should be applied to petitioners who
face a death sentence. 2
The Fourth Circuit first addressed the question of whether the nature of

Rouse's claims should affect the decision to consider an untimely petition."3

Rouse argued that the strength and seriousness of his juror bias and attorney
misconduct claims should shape the equitable tolling analysis." ° Effectively, this
approach circumvents the statute of limitations by allowing courts to consider
the merits of untimely claims."5 The Fourth Circuit stated that "[flt seems
curiously circular to say... that we consider the merits in deciding whether we
can consider the merits."" The court stated that this approach would frustrate
two central purposes of AEDPA, preventing delay and encouraging finality."7
Thus, the court declined to adopt an equitable tolling test that would consider the
strength and seriousness of a petitioner's claims."0 '
Rouse argued that the concurrence in Drm v Walker" 9 supported his
argument that the seriousness of a potential constitutional violation should affect

97. Rcw4 339 F.3d at 250.
98. Id at 251.
99. Id Rouse argued that the fact that he "faces a death sentence is an important part of the
equitable tolling equation," and that the "significance and magnitude of the potentiallybarred claim
is a primary justification for equitable tolling." Id
100. Id
101. Id (quoting Haris,209 F.3d at 330)
102. Id
103. Roe, 339 F.3d at 251.
104. Id

105.

Id

106.
107.

Id at 252 n.15.
Id at 251.

108.
109.

Id
533 US. 167 (2001).
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the court's equitable tolling analysis." The Fourth Circuit rejected Rouse's
characterization of the Duwranconcurrence."' The DtAram concurrence stated
that a timely petition containing unexhausted claims may warrant equitable
tolling." 2 The Fourth Circuit found that Duncan applied onlyto petitions filed
within the one-year limitations period."' Rouse did not file a petition containing
unexhausted claims within the limitations period."' The Dwam concurrence did
not suggest that the nature of a petitioner's claims should factor into the equitable tolling analysis."' Thus, the Fourth Circuit found that the Dwuna concurrence did not applyto Rouse's situation."6
Rouse also relied on Baskin v UninaiStates"7 for the proposition that the
equitable tolling analysis should include a consideration of the merits of the
underlying claim."' The petitioner in Baskin claimed that attorney error caused
his untimely federal habeas petition." 9 The Baskin court stated that" i]t would
be grossly inequitable to bar petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim
on the basis that counsel's error permitted the statute of limitations to run.' "120
The Fourth Circuit, however, stated that Bask in did not suggest that the merits
of the underlying claimwere a reason for equitable tolling.' Unlike Rcwe, Baskin
involved trial counsel error which "constituted constitutional ineffective assistance of counsel," such that "counsel's error is not attributable to the petitioner."" The Fourth Circuit found that Rouse's former trial counsel's error did
not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel and was therefore attributable to
Rouse.' The court found that Baskin did not apply because Rouse's counsel's
error did not rise to the level of ineffective assistance. 24
110.

R=4se 339 F.3d at 251 (citing Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 182 (2001) (Stevens, J.,

concurring)).

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id at 251-52.
Id;Dtrmv, 533 US. 182-83 (Stevens, J., concurring).
R=4
e 339 F.3d at 251-52.
Idat 252.
Id at 251.
Id. at 252.
998 F. Supp. 188 (D. Conn. 1998).
Rcee 339 F.3d at 252; see Baskin v. United States, 998 F. Supp. 188, 189-90 (D. Conn.

119.

Roue, 339 F.3d at 252.

120.

Id (quoting Bazkim 998 F. Supp. at 190) (alteration in original.

121.
122.

Id
Id; see Cder= 501 U.S. at 753-54 (discussing that attorney error, short of ineffective

1998) (allowing equitable tolling for the petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel clain'.

assistance of counsel, is attributable to the client); Mwnra 477 US. at 488 (finding that a habeas
petitioner was bound by attorney error).
123. Rose, 339 F.3d at 250.
124. Idat 252.

20031

ROUSE V. LEE

The Fourth Circuit then turned to the question of whether the nature of
Rouse's sentence should affect the equitable tolling analysis."' Rouse argued that
"less than 'extraordinary' circumstances [should] trigger equitable tolling in capital
cases because 'death is different.'""26 According to the Fourth Circuit, although
the United States Supreme Court has treated death penalty cases differently, it
has not applied a different test to capital cases on collateral review.'
Any
distinctions between capital and non-capital cases have related to the procedures
to which a defendant is entitled at trial or sentencing.12 The Rce court stated
that "the Supreme Court has repeatedlydeclined to treat death differently in the
post-conviction context."' The Fourth Circuit stated that relaxing the statute
of limitations in capital cases would contradict the purposes of AEDPA by
causing delayin the execution of criminal sentences. 30 Therefore, the court held
that "Rouse's death sentence does not change the test ... to determine if equitable tolling is warranted.""'
5. Dissent

The dissent disagreed with the majority's decision to deny equitable
tolling."2 The dissent argued that "[i]f equity has anyplace in our habeas jurisprudence ... then the exceptional circumstances in this case demand tolling." '
The dissent emphasized the "disturbing" facts surrounding Rouse's conviction."
Rouse was an African American convicted byan all-white jury for the attempted
rape and murder of a white woman. 3 ' After Rouse's appeal was denied, he
discovered that a juror deliberately concealed the facts of his mother's murder
125. Id at 253-54.
126. Id at 254 (quoting Fahy v. Horn, 240 F.3d 239, 245 (3d ar. 2001) (applying a different
test for equitable tolling in captal cases)).
127. Id It is possible that the Fourth -cuit is referring to Dwmn which denies tolling for
a petitioner's federal habeas application under AEDPA. Durum, 533 US. at 181-82.
128.
Rome, 339 F.3d at 254; see Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 US. 249, 256-58 (1988) (illustrat
that even though capital defendants might be entitled to heightened procedural safeguards at trial,

the standard of appellate review does not change in a capital case).
129.

Rcue, 339 F.3d at 255; seeSmith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527,538 (1986) (rejecting the claim

that the principles governing procedural default apply differently depending on the nature of the
penalty); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983) (stating that "the qualitative difference
of death from all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the
capital sentencing determination").
130. Ruse,339 F.3d at 256;see28 U.S.C S 2244(d) (1)(2000) (providing that aone-year period
of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus; part of AEDPA).
131. Rome, 339 F.3d at 256.
132. Id at 257 (Motz,J., dissenting).
133. Id
134. Id
135. Id
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and his racial prejudice in order to sit on the jury. 36 The dissent stressed that
Rouse had never received a hearing to explore his "disturbing evidence of juror
bias." 37
' The dissent argued that Rouse should not face a death sentence without
a hearing on his claims simply because he filed his habeas petition on day after
the AEDPA limitations period expired.'
The dissent argued that although Rouse's petition was filed one daylate, his
former lawyers had relied "on a facially applicable state procedural rule and
federal decisions interpreting Federal Rule of Qvil Procedure 6(e) in calculating
the filing deadline."' 3 Rouse argued that his lawyers had " 'played Russian
roulette with [his] rights' in waiting to file his petition."14 The dissent pointed
to the fact that Rouse had diligentlypursued every avenue of appeal and that he
did not know or consent to the late filing of his petition.14' The dissent also
argued that standard principles of agencyshould not bind Rouse to his attorneys'
errors because of Rouse's limited mental ability.'42 The facts surrounding
Rouse's mental ability "render it impossible to conclude that Rouse could
meaningfullyparticipate in an agencyrelationship with his lawyers, especiallyone
concerning the bewildering complexity of the habeas corpus rules."
The dissent emphasized the discretionarynature of equitable tolling.!" The
dissent argued that courts should allow greater flexibilityin applying the AEDPA
statute of limitations in a habeas context. 4 "The strength of the claims in a
habeas petition -rwt inform a court's decision to exercise its equitable power to
toll limitations at least in cases such as this one, where the evidentiary basis for
136. Id
137. Rouse, 339 F.3d at 257 (Motz, J., dissenting).
138. Id at 257-58 (Moz J.,dissenting); se 28 US.C S 2244(d)(1) (2000) (explaining the one
year statute of limitations that applies to the filing of a federal habeas petition; part of AEDPA).
139. Rise, 339 F.3d at 258 (Motz, J., dissenting); se FED. R. QV. P. 6(e) (stating that
"[w]henever a party has the right or is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a
prescribed period after the service of a notice or other paper upon the party and the notice or paper
is served upon the party by mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period").
140. Ruse, 339 F.3d at 259 dotz, J., dissenting) (quoting Supplemental Brief of Appellant at

7).

141. Id
142. Id at 259 n.3 (MotzJ., dissenting). Rouse was classified as having "bo r d erline intellectual
functioning" with an IQ of between seventy and eighty. Id Due to brain dysfunction, pediatric
head injury, early substance abuse, and a severely dysfunctional family, Rouse had compromised
psychological and neuropsychological functioning. Id
143.
Id
144. Id at 259-60 (Motz, J., dissenting); see 28 US.C S 2244(d)(1) (2000) (stating that a one
year statute of limitations applies to the filing of a federal habeas petition; part of AEDPA); Fisher
v.Johnson, 174 F.3d 710,713 (5th Car. 1999) (discussing the discretionarynature of equitable tolling
which turns on the facts and circumstances of particular cases and does not lend itself to bright-line
rules).
145. R=e 339 F.3d at 260 (Motz, J., dissenting).
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such claims has never been subjected to judicial scrutiny."" The court should
consider that Rouse never received an evidentiary hearing, had limited mental
capacity, and presented a powerful constitutional claim.' 47
The dissent also disagreed with the majoritys assertion that Rouse's sentence of death should not affect the equitable tolling analysis.'48 In Hars,the
Fourth Crcuit recognized that the presence of a death sentence affected equita50 the United States Supreme Court
ble tolling analysis.14 In Eddi v ( aOn;za'
stated that it has been willing to overlook requirements in capital cases that 5it
would ordinarily impose in non-capital cases " 'in the interests of justice.' "'1
The dissent encouraged the court to recognize the inherent difference of a death
sentence and refrain from hiding behind "procedural rules when confronted with
such circumstances." 5 1 The dissent rejected the majority's rigid application of
the AEDPA limitations in favor of a more flexible consideration of the facts in
a particular case. 3'

IV. Applia

in Viv

Roue confirmed that the AEDPA statute of limitations will be strictly
applied regardless of whether the defendant faces a death sentence.' Under 28
U.S.C S 2244(d)(2), " 'the entire period of state post-conviction proceedings,
from initial filing to final disposition bythe highest state court (whether decision
on the merits, denial of certiorari, or expiration of the period of time to seek
further appellate review), is tolled from the limitations period for federal habeas
corpus petitioners .' "M Because Virginia has not opted into the six-month
limitations period set forth under 28 U.S.C S2263, it is still under the one-year
provision set out in S 2244(d). 6 Attorneys must file federal habeas petitions
146. Id at 261 (Motz, J., dissenting).
147. Id at 260 (Motz, J., dissenting).
148. Id at 262-63 (Motz, J., dissenting).
149. Id at 262 (Motz,J., dissenting);seeHais,209 F.3d at 328-30 (discussing stct limitations
rules).
150. 455 US. 104 (1982).
151. R=e 339 F.3d at 263 (MotzJ., dissenting) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 US. 104,
117 n.* (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
152. Id
153. Id at 266 (Motz, J., dissenting);see28 US.C S 2244(d)(1) (2000) (explaining the one year
statute of limitations that applies to the filing of a federal habeas petition; part of AEDPA).
154. Rcze 339 F.3d at 251.
155. Id at 243-44 (quoting Tar)&, 186 F.3d at 561); s~e28 U.S.C S 2244(d)(2) (explaining that
the deadline for filg a federal habeas petition is tolled while the judgment or claimis still pending).
156. See 28 U.S.C S 2244(d)(1) (providing that a one-year period of limitation shall apply to
an application for a writ of habeas corpus;part of AEDPA); 28 US.C S2263(a) (2000) (stating that
"[amny application under this chapter for habeas corpus relief under section 2254 must be filed in
the appropriate district court not later than 180 days after final State court affirmance of the
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within one year of the date when either. (1) the Supreme Court of Virginia
denies the state habeas petition; or (2)after the United States Supreme Court
denies certiorari. If the Supreme Court of Virginia denies a habeas petition, the
one-year limitations period begins to run upon the court's entry of a final judgment.17 The Rules of the Virginia Supreme Court state that "[t]he date of entry
of any final judgment, order, or decree shall be the date the judgment, order, or
decree is signed bythe judge."' Therefore, habeas counsel must file the federal
159
habeas petition within one year of the date the judge signs the judgment.
Capital defense attorneys should be aware that Virginia habeas proceedings
are common law actions and are therefore civil in nature. In Rouse,the Fourth
Circuit denied the claim that Rouse's habeas petition remained pending during
the time in which he could have sought a petition for rehearing."6 In North
Carolina, a MAR is criminal in nature and petitions for rehearing are not available
in criminal proceedings. 6 ' Unlike the situation inRouse,Virginia habeas proceedings are civil actions. Thus, other civil rules might be available to attorneys who
fail to file a federal habeas petition within the one-year statute of limitations
period.
It is important to recognize the different issues emphasized bythe majority
and the dissent in Rcse. The majority's decision to deny relief was based on
procedural determinations. 62 The court stressed that strict adherence to procedural limitations was necessaryto ensure the underlying goals of AEDPA, namely
finality.6 The majority's decision illustrates its belief that the most important
issues in this case were procedural. The dissent, on the other hand, focused on
fundamental fairness issues.'" The dissent contrasted the strength of Rouse's
conviction and sentence on direct reviewor the expiration of the time for seeking such review"; part
of AEDPA); E-mail from Michele Brace, Attorney, to Priya Nath, Editor, Capital Defense Journal,
Washington and Lee University School of Law (Sept. 9,2003,15:32 EST) (on file with authors).
Michele Brace, afederal habeas practitioner in Virginia, verifies that Virginia is not an opt-in state
and is subject to the one-year statute of limitations period.
157. E-mail from Michele Brace, Attorney, to Priya Nath, Editor, Capital Defense Journal,
Washington and Lee University School of Law (Sept. 9,2003, 15:32 ES) (on file with authors).
158. VA. SUP. Cr. R.1:1.
159. The Supreme Court of Virginia exercises original jurisdiction over petitions for writs of
habeas corpus. VA. CONST. art. VI, S 1. Thus, when that court denies a habeas petition, there is

no court to which a mandate should issue under the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia. VA.
SUP. Cr. R.5:38.
160. Rowe, 339 F.3d at 244-45.
161. Idat 245.
162. . Se id at 257 (holding that Rouse was not entitled to equitable tolling because he failed
to show extraordinarycircumstances beyond his control that prevented him from complying with
the AEDPA statute of limitations").
163. Id at 256.
164. See id at 263-64 (Motz, J., dissenting) (stating that "to confine even the possibility of
habeas relief within rigid formalistic boundaries ties the hand of equity in a manner fundamentally
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claims and the severity of his punishmentwith the extremely minor violation of
the statute of limitations period.' From the dissent's perspective, the court
should focus on the larger equitable issues and not "hide behind procedural
rules."' In light of Rcxwe, it appears that procedural issues trump fundamental
fairness concerns- even in capital cases.
V. Qnw ibn
Rcusedemonstrates that statutorytolling analysis isbased purelyon state and
federal law.' The Fourth Crcuit denied statutory tolling because Rouse failed
to present valid reasons to extend the pendencyof his chtim.'" Rouse was not
entitled to equitable tolling because he failed to meet the requirements of the
exceptional circumstances test.169 Most importantly,the Fourth Grcuit's decision
to deny equitable tolling underscores the court's reluctance to apply a different
equitable tolling test to death penalty cases. 70
Jessie A. Seiden
Priya I. Nath

at odds with our Nation's commitment to fair process").
165. Id at 260 (Motz, J., dissenting). In particular, the dissent discussed Rouse's "powerful
constitutional claim" regarding juror deception and racial bias. Id
166. Rcg 339 F.3d at 263 (Motz, J., dissenting).
167. Id at 243-46.
168. Idat 244-46.
169. Id at 257.
170. Id at 251.

